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Abstract
Sticky information monetary models have been used in the macroeconomic literature to ex-
plain some of the observed features regarding inflation dynamics. In this paper, we explore the
consequences of relaxing the rational expectations assumption usually taken in this type of model;
in particular, by considering expectations formed through adaptive learning, it is possible to arrive
to results other than the trivial convergence to a fixed point long-term equilibrium. The results
involve the possibility of endogenous cyclical motion (periodic and a-periodic), which emerges
essentially in scenarios of hyperinflation. In low inflation settings, the introduction of learning
implies a less severe impact of monetary shocks that, nevertheless, tend to last for additional time
periods relative to the pure perfect foresight setup.
∗Address: Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administrac¸a˜o de Lisboa, Av. Miguel Bombarda
20, 1069-035 Lisbon, Portugal. Phone number: + 351 93 342 09 15. I would like to acknowledge
the helpful comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees; the usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
The sticky information paradigm was born as a reply to the New Keynesian
price stickiness setup, widely used in monetary policy analysis (see Clarida,
Gali and Gertler [3] and Woodford [23]). Mankiw and Reis [8] have stressed
that their interpretation of monetary policy has the virtue of tting better a
series of macroeconomic facts. Unlike the New Keynesian model, the Mankiw-
Reis sticky information framework is able to explain how and why: (i) ination
is persistent; (ii) monetary policy shocks have a delayed and gradual e¤ect on
ination; (iii) desinations are always contractionary. Above all, the sticky
information setup may be viewed as an alternative to a paradoxical point of
the New Keynesian approach: a model that has in its essence the prevalence
of price rigidity is a model in which ination changes fast; it cannot replicate
the ination inertia found in empirical evidence.
The information stickiness model imposes no constraint on the timing
of pricing decisions. Firms can modify prices whenever they choose, how-
ever there is a constraint on information propagation: information concerning
macroeconomic conditions di¤uses slowly throughout the economy, making
price changes to be often decided on the basis of outdated information. The
slow information di¤usion is assumed to be the result of the costs of acquiring
and processing information, i.e., the costs of re-optimization. As the result of
the sticky information hypothesis, the economys current price level becomes
a function of the weighted average of past expectations concerning the present
state of the economy, with each rm having updated its information set at any
past date, a decision that is independent of the same decision made by any
other rm.
The initial version of the model was relatively straightforward: it focused
essentially on the shape of the Phillips curve and the model was closed with
a simple money demand equation. The same authors have then sophisticated
and complemented the model in various directions. First, Mankiw and Reis
[9] explicitly integrate into the model the dynamics of wages and productivity;
the additional conclusion is that productivity slowdowns have a same type of
impact as desinations, i.e., they both lead to an employment trajectory that
falls below the full information employment level. Second, Reis [15] [16] builds
a theory of inattentiveness that provides the microfoundations for the sticky
information approach; both producers and consumers face costs of acquiring,
absorbing and processing information and these costs have to be taken into
account when agents solve their optimal control problems (in practice, the
standard prot maximization and utility maximization problems will involve
an additional constraint relating information costs). The result is an optimal
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degree of inattentiveness, i.e., agents rationally choose to be inattentive to
news, updating information on a sporadic basis. Rational inattention is also
modelled resorting to alternative approaches, as in Sims [19] who alternatively
to an intertemporal optimization approach supports the analysis of limited
ability to process information on the modelling of a communication channel
with nite Shannon capacity.
A third relevant extension of the information stickiness model consists in
the attempt to combine the frameworks central assumption with a general
equilibrium setting. This is what Mankiw and Reis [10] [11] suggest. In this
new setting, inattentiveness is pervasive: all the agents in the economy, i.e.,
consumers, rms and workers, choose to update the corresponding set of in-
formation only sporadically, meaning that past expectations on present events
will be a common feature of the various central macroeconomic relations: the
Phillips curve, the IS curve and a wage curve. Prices, consumption plans and
wages are all set, to some extent, based on outdated information. The relevant
fact concerning this version of the model is that it proves better at matching
key empirical facts concerning economic uctuations than the less sophisticated
model in which only rms resort to outdated information to decide about their
activity.
This paper intends to o¤er an additional contribution to the sticky infor-
mation literature, by exploring the consequences of departing from the rational
expectations assumption. To undertake the analysis, we restrict the model to
a deterministic setting.1 Under perfect foresight, the predictions of the sticky
information model are rather simple: the ination rate will converge to the
rate of money supply, and it will remain on this value as long as the equi-
librium remains undisturbed. Nevertheless, information stickiness continues
to have a relevant role in such a purely deterministic setting: the degree of
information stickiness will indicate the velocity of convergence towards the
equilibrium point. If there is no stickiness, the adjustment is instantaneous;
on the contrary, if the information stickiness is absolute, the ination level re-
mains xed and no convergence occurs. Between these extreme circumstances,
a lower degree of information stickiness is synonymous of faster adjustment.
The main point is that independently of the degree of sluggishness in updating
information, convergence to the steady state is guaranteed under perfect fore-
sight (except in the unrealistic case in which information is never updated).
Once we depart from rational expectations, di¤erent equilibrium outcomes are
eventually obtained and uctuations may be endogenously triggered and not
1Although, at the end of the paper (section 7), the possibility of stochastic shocks is
introduced in order to address impulse-response dynamics in the discussed scenario.
just the result of extrinsic forces.
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To depart from perfect foresight, we will consider that agents have access to
two sets of information: (i) information about the state of the economy, which
is updated only sporadically and (ii) information about the past behavior of the
assumed endogenous variable(s) (in the case, the ination rate), which is known
by all agents in every time period and that allows to learn the current value of
the variable(s). Agents that have updated their information about the state of
the economy in the past may have insu¢ cient data in order to predict perfectly
todays outcomes and they will resort essentially to past performance data on
the variable in order to predict or learn the current value; on the contrary,
agents who have updated information on the state of the economy recently
will be able, to a large extent, to form rational expectations and therefore will
not need to largely resort to learning. The learning component of expectations
is modelled in a trivial way: we consider an adaptive learning algorithm under
which the growth rate of the price level is estimated resorting to a simple least
squares regression applied over a perceived law of motion for prices.
The characterization of the dynamics of the model, involving the above
mentioned expectations assumptions, will attribute relevance to four para-
meters: the income elasticity of money demand, a parameter measuring real
rigidities, the degree of information stickiness and the growth rate of money
supply. For a large set of possible combinations of parameters, stability is
found, i.e., there is convergence to the monetary steady state that prevails
under perfect foresight. Two-period, quasi-periodic and chaotic cycles are
found, following a ip bifurcation, for a signicant level of information sticki-
ness and a strong rate of growth of money supply. Endogenous cycles are, in
this model, attached to scenarios of hyperination. This is a relevant result
since some studies, e.g. Marcet and Sargent [13] and Marcet and Nicolini [12],
point precisely to an association between fast growth of the price level and
learning processes with outcomes that may deviate from the perfect foresight
equilibrium.
Studies on the empirical validity of the sticky-information Phillips curve
(e.g., Khan and Zhu [7], Dopke et al. [5] and Coibion [4], among others),
point to an acceptable t between evidence and models based on the sticky-
information assumption; furthermore, as Reis [17] highlights, the observed mis-
alignments between the data and the time series generated by the theoretical
structure are not mainly caused by inattentiveness / information sluggishness,
but rather by the assumption that in these models agents will form expec-
tations on the grounds of perfect rationality, given the information sets they
face. Such an evidence furnishes a strong motivation to continue exploring the
sticky-information setup, analyzing it further beyond the rational expectations
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/ perfect foresight benchmark framework. By exploring distinct assumptions
concerning the formation of expectations, one will possibly nd new avenues
for achieving a better match with the data and also to attribute a stronger
logical coherence to the modelling structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
sticky information model. In section 3 the dynamics of the model under ra-
tional expectations is addressed. Section 4 introduces adaptive learning and
proposes a rule concerning the formation of aggregate expectations. Sections
5 and 6 proceed with the dynamic analysis of the model, both locally and in a
global perspective. Section 7 studies how a monetary policy shock impacts on
the long-run evolution of the ination rate, allowing to compare the response
to shocks between the scenarios of full rationality and learning. Finally, sec-
tion 8 concludes. Three appendices are also added at the end of the paper:
appendix A derives the central dynamic equation of the model; appendix B
indicates how the model could be sophisticated through the introduction of a
more complex monetary policy structure, namely by resorting to an IS relation;
in appendix C we change the rule governing the formation of expectations, in
order to further explore the implications of learning in the sticky informa-
tion environment and to evaluate the robustness of the sticky-information /
adaptive learning analytical structure.
2 The Sticky InformationModel: General Fea-
tures
The presentation of the sticky information model follows closely the setup by
Mankiw and Reis [8]; thus, we just present the basic features of the model that
are necessary for the discussion that follows in next sections. In the considered
environment, prices are fully exible in the sense that rms have the possibility
of changing them in every time period. However, agents may be inattentive
and, thus, base their pricing decisions on outdated information. As remarked in
Reis [15] [16], rmsinattentiveness is not necessarily a synonymous of lack of
rationality; an optimal degree of inattentiveness arises as the result of equating
benets of price changes and costs of acquiring and processing information.
Therefore, relevant information will di¤use slowly throughout the economy,
as rms choose to optimally update their information set only sporadically,
remaining inattentive in the time length between adjustment dates.
Let pt 2 R be the logarithm of the price level and yt 2 R the logarithm of
the output gap. The output gap is dened as the di¤erence between e¤ective
and potential output. Consider as well a parameter  > 0 dening a measure
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of sensitivity of the rms target price to the output gap. Firms are monop-
olistically competitive, produce a single homogeneous good and act optimally
to derive the following target price:
pt = pt + yt (1)
Equation (1) reveals that rms will desire to maintain the existing price
only if there is a coincidence between e¤ective and potential output at date t;
otherwise, the target price will rise above the observable price level when rms
are faced with a positive output gap, and the target price will fall below pt in
the opposite circumstance.
Parameter  has an important role in the analysis and therefore we should
further clarify its meaning. This parameter is also known as reecting real
rigidities and according to Romer [18] such real rigidities may involve the
following items: thick-market externalities, economies of scale and agglom-
eration economies, nancial market imperfections, imperfect information that
makes existing consumers more responsive to increases in prices than potential
consumers are to price decreases, just to cite some of the most relevant.
Under the assumption of sticky information, a rm that last updated its
price plans j periods ago will set a price that corresponds to the expectations
formed in period t   j concerning the target price in t, i.e., pjt = Et jpt with
pjt the price set by a rm in t when the rm updated its information in period
t  j.
Aggregation of individual prices will follow a mechanism similar to the
one introduced by Calvo [2] concerning nominal rigidities. It is assumed that,
at each time moment, a share of rms  2 [0; 1] collects information on the
state of the economy and updates prices resorting to such information; the
other rms also set prices in a given time moment but resorting to outdated
information. If  = 1, there is full information exibility [rule (1) is applied in
every moment by every rm]; if  = 0, there are no rms updating information,
and therefore prices remain constant. In practice, it is admissible to consider
that some intermediate level of information updating exists and thus  is some
value between 0 and 1 with the degree of information sluggishness rising as 
becomes closer to the lower bound of the interval.
In Reis [15], it is demonstrated that in an economy with many agents
the distribution of information updating converges to a Poisson distribution,
implying that each rm has an equal probability of being one of the rms
updating prices with the most recent information, independently of the date
of the last information review. The aggregate price level will be the weighted
average of the prices set by each one of the rms what, under the Poisson
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process, translates into pt = 
1P
j=0
(1   )jpjt . Replacing, in this expression,
each rms price by the expected target price j periods ago and having in
consideration equation (1), aggregate prices in period t will be given by
pt = 
1X
j=0
(1  )jEt j(pt + yt) (2)
In expression (2), the aggregate price level is basically the direct result of
two assumptions: reaction of each rm to the output gap in triggering price
changes and information stickiness.
Dening t := pt   pt 1 as the ination rate and gt := yt   yt 1 as the
growth rate of the output gap, simple algebra allows to transform the price
equation (2) into the well known sticky information Phillips curve,
t =

1  yt + 
1X
j=0
(1  )jEt 1 j (t + gt) (3)
Equation (3) indicates the existence of a contemporaneous relation between
the output gap and ination; besides this, todays ination rate is determined
by past expectations concerning the current state of the economy.
To proceed with the analysis of the model, some consideration about mone-
tary policy must be added. In appendix (appendix A at the end of the paper),
we show how a simple equation describing the equilibrium in the money mar-
ket, combined with the displayed Phillips relation, allows for presenting the
dynamics of ination as follows:
t+1 =


m+
   

t +
   


1X
j=0
(1  )jEt+1 j (t+1)
    


1X
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) (4)
In equation (4), m is a constant rate of money growth and  > 0 is a
parameter measuring the income elasticity of money demand. The second part
of the appendix (appendix B) discusses how one could sophisticate the model
by considering a more structured approach to monetary policy. The choice of
a simple rule of adjustment of money supply to demand conditions is justied
on the basis of proposing a framework that is analytically tractable in a simple
way once we introduce learning.
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It is the study of the dynamics underlying equation (4) that will concern
us in the following sections. It can be interpreted as the reduced form of the
sticky information model. If one denes the steady state as the scenario in
which ination remains constant, it is straightforward to obtain the monetary
steady state  = m. The dynamics of (4) will depend on which assumption
one takes about the formation of expectations.
3 Perfect Foresight Dynamics
The perfect foresight assumption implies that independently of the considered
past moments of time, agents will be able to accurately predict todays level
of ination. Under this assumption, equation (4) will be equivalent to
t+1 = m+ (1  )t (5)
The only relevant parameter to characterize ination dynamics in the sim-
ple sticky information monetary model is the parameter representing the de-
gree of information stickiness. Because  2 (0; 1) one observes that the system
is stable: convergence towards the monetary steady state is guaranteed inde-
pendently of the initial state 0. Parameter  will translate the velocity of
adjustment towards  = m; if ! 0, no adjustment will take place (the in-
ation rate su¤ers no change); if  = 1, there is an instantaneous adjustment.
The larger is the value of , i.e., the more exible information is, the faster is
the adjustment process.
Figure 1 draws the time trajectory of the ination rate for 0 = 0:04
and m = 0:02, considering three di¤erent degrees of information stickiness:
 = 0:25,  = 0:5,  = 0:75. Observe that the lower is , the slower will be
the adjustment process. In deterministic terms this is the only information the
model is capable of conveying, as long as one sticks with the perfect foresight
/ rational expectations assumption.
It is straightforward to understand that no dynamic convergence would
occur if 0 = m; in this case, the system is initially at the steady-state and,
in the absence of any external shock, it will remain there independently of the
degree of information stickiness. For any 0 6= m, the level of stickiness will
determine how many periods are needed in order to asymptotically reach the
steady-state. Note that the role of information updating gains relevance when
a disturbance over the equilibrium in which the system rests occurs; a more
infrequent information updating leads to a more inertial response to the shock,
i.e., to a lengthier reestablishment of the initial steady-state.
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Figure 1: Ination dynamics in the deterministic sticky information model
(perfect foresight).
A crucial assumption in this paper is that the initial state is one in which
the system deviates from rational expectations: by taking 0 6= m, one is
considering that the economic system is bornin a state of disequilibrium and
that the rational behavior of the economic agents will allow for a convergence
towards the equilibrium (at a rate that depends on the available information).
A possible explanation for this assumption can be found in the complete ab-
sence of knowledge about the evolution of the economy that agents might
display at the initial state, i.e., initially rms will have to form prices without
any information on how monetary policy is conducted; once economic agents
perceive how money supply evolves, they will adjust their behavior accordingly.
Therefore, t = 0 can be interpreted as the time period when all rms initi-
ate their activity and, thus, have insu¢ cient knowledge on how the economy
behaves and how authorities undertake their policies.
4 Learning Past Results
In this section, we assume that the ability of economic agents in predicting
perfectly current ination values, independently of how far in the past they
formulate expectations about the current state of the economy, is limited.
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More specically, we consider the assumption described in the introduction:
agents possess two information sets, one concerning the state of the economy
which is updated sporadically, and another one consisting on the observation
of all past ination levels prior to moment t. This last information set allows
agents to predict the value of the ination rate through a process of adaptive
learning.
We will consider the following rule in what respects the formation of ex-
pectations:
Et(t) = t;Et j(t) = bt;8j = 1; 2; ::: (6)
According to rule (6), if expectations are formed in the current period,
agents will know the true value of this rate; otherwise, agents will ignore
any information on the state of the economy and they will just resort to the
observation of the past performance of the ination rate through time t  
1. Variable bt represents the estimated level of ination at t computed by
resorting to all the information on  through t  1. Under this hypothesis, it
is straightforward to regard that 
1P
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) = t +(1  )bt.
The monetary model equation (4) takes, under the established assumption,
the form
t+1 =
1
(=)(1  ) +   [m+(=)(1 )t+(= 1)(1 )(bt+1 bt)]
(7)
Note that if one eliminates the learning component (by taking bt+1 = t+1
and bt = t), we return to the simple perfect foresight equation (5).
Having no anticipated knowledge on the value of b, agents estimate it by
acting as econometricians, i.e., by running a least squares regression. Following
Bullard [1], we consider that agents do not estimate directly a constant ination
rate but a constant rate of price change, that is, the adopted perceived law of
motion is the following,
Pt = exp(b)Pt 1 (8)
In (8), Pt is the price level, i.e., pt = lnPt. Estimating in t the ination
rate using data available through time t  1 yields,
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exp(bt) =
t 1P
s=1
Ps 1Ps
t 1P
s=1
P 2s 1
(9)
The expectations feedback system composed by (8) and (9) can be trans-
formed into a recursive dynamic system. This requires introducing a gain se-
quence variable, which is dened as t := P 2t 1=
tP
s=1
P 2s 1. Variable t is known
as a decreasing gain sequence since as time passes and the number of observa-
tions increases, the gain or impact of each new observation becomes smaller.
The derived system of di¤erence equations is
exp(bt+1) = exp(bt) + t  Pt
Pt 1
  exp(bt) (10)
t+1 =
t
Pt 1
Pt
2
+ t
(11)
Under our denition of variables, Pt
Pt 1
= exp(t).
Equation (7) together with the learning scheme [i.e., equations (10) and
(11)] form a three rst-order equations system with three endogenous vari-
ables: t, bt and t; observe that equation (10) can be presented as bt+1 =
ln [(1  t) exp(bt) + t exp(t)]. In the next sections, we address this models
dynamics. From a local dynamics point of view, a general analysis may be
pursued; globally, one will need to calibrate the model in order to undertake
a meaningful characterization of dynamic results. The benchmark calibration
will be  = 0:1,  = 0:5 and  = 0:25 (these are the values of parameters
considered by Mankiw and Reis [9] in their simulation of ination dynamics
under sticky information).
We will consider that parameter values reect quarterly data, and therefore
the value of  can be interpreted in terms of concrete calendar dates. If  = 1,
then information about the state of the economy is updated every quarter of
year; for instance if  = 0:25, this will imply that economic agents update their
information on average once a year. Generalizing, one can say that for some
stickiness parameter  = e, the average frequency of information updating will
be 1=e quarters, or 3=e months. Although theoretically  might assume any
value between zero and one, it is admissible to impose a plausible positive lower
bound; for instance, the assumption that  > 0:05 indicates that information
will be updated at least every 20 quarters or 60 months.
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In the subsequent analysis, it does not make sense to consider a separate
discussion on the impact of changes in the values of parameters  and ; their
e¤ect over the economic system arises always through the ratio =. The
displayed quotient can assume only positive values. The benchmark case is
such that the real rigidities parameter is lower than the income elasticity of
money demand; however, one will observe that departures from stability will
require a smaller than 1 value for the ratio =.
5 Dynamics under Learning
The steady-state value of the gain sequence variable is  = 1  [exp(m)] 2.
This is a positive and lower than 1 value for any m > 0. The mone-
tary steady-state can, then, be fully displayed: (; b; ) = fm;m; 1  
[exp(m)] 2g. Local stability results are addressable after computing a lin-
earized system in the vicinity of the presented steady-state. The obtained
system is
24 bt+1   bt+1   
t+1   
35 =
24 1    0   1

  +( 1)


0
0 2

[exp(m)]3
1  
3524 bt   bt   
t   
35 (12)
with  := (=)(1  ) +  > 0.
Resorting to the center manifold theorem, one can exclude the third dy-
namic equation from the analysis, i.e., we can concentrate on the sub-matrix
of the Jacobian matrix in (12) respecting to its two rst rows and two rst
columns. This matrix will be designated by J and it will furnish relevant
information regarding local dynamics.2
Proposition 1 states a rst result concerning stability.
Proposition 1 If 

 2 3
4(1 ) , then the system is locally stable 8m > 0.
Furthermore, for an information updating schedule such that   2=3, stability
will prevail 8m, ,  > 0.
2The center manifold theorem applies when the state space of the system can be split
in more than one invariant subspace; invariant subspaces are found when the corresponding
eigenvalues are obtained resorting solely to a sub-dimension of the system, i.e., without the
need for considering the whole system. This is the case at hand: the matrix in (12) displays
two invariant subspaces; the rst is composed by sub-matrix J and the other one by the
element in the last row and last column of the matrix (this corresponds to the eigenvalue
associated to variable t; this is an eigenvalue locating inside the unit circle, and therefore
one identies from the start a stable dimension). See Medio and Lines [14] for details on
the center manifold theorem.
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Proof. Trace and determinant of J are, respectively, Tr(J) = 2  


and
Det(J) =   (1 )


. Stability conditions for two-dimensional discrete time
systems are
1 Det(J) > 0
1  Tr(J) +Det(J) > 0
1 + Tr(J) +Det(J) > 0
The stability conditions 1   Det(J) = +(1 )

> 0 and 1   Tr(J) +
Det(J) = 


> 0 hold, for any possible parameter values. The only constraint
on stability comes from the third condition, which requires  < 4(=)(1 )+2
2  .
The equilibrium value of the gain sequence variable is bounded below 1, and
therefore if 4(=)(1 )+2
2   1, then stability is guaranteed. This last condition
is equivalent to the one in the proposition.
The result in the second part of the proposition is straightforward to obtain
once we evaluate inequality 

 2 3
4(1 ) numerically. Because the quotient =
must be larger than zero, we replace the ratio by zero in the inequality and
solve in order to . Straightforward computation allows to reach the boundary
2=3
Constraint   2=3 in proposition 1 indicates that introducing learning
into the formation of expectations in the way we have done implies stability
of the monetary steady state as long as information is updated at least every
1:5 quarters (1=0:667) or 4:5 months (3=0:667); more infrequent information
updating can lead to a departure from a stability outcome, depending on the
values assumed by the degree of real rigidities, the income elasticity of money
demand and the growth rate of money supply.
One can approach graphically the models local results by representing
areas of local stability and instability in the space of parameters. In gure 2,
we draw the regions where stability holds for any admissible m (we take in
consideration the constraint in proposition 1). The other region, close to the
origin (i.e., for low values of both = and ), is the region in which instability
is possible for at least some values of the growth rate of m.
Let us focus attention in the case of possible loss of stability. The following
result applies:
Proposition 2 Let 

< 2 3
4(1 ) . In this case, local stability will require an
upper bound on the rate of money growth. In the point in which m =
ln
q
2 
2 3 4(=)(1 ) , a ip bifurcation occurs.
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Figure 2: Stability properties in the space of parameters.
Proof. In the proof of proposition 1, we have remarked that the rst two
stability conditions hold independently of parameter values, while the third
condition imposes a constraint on the steady state value of the gain sequence:
 < 4(=)(1 )+2
2  . Recalling that 
 = 1  [exp(m)] 2, and solving in order
to m, we obtain the following inequality:
m < ln
s
2  
2  3  4(=)(1  )
Therefore, one realizes that stability requires the money growth rate to be
below a given combination of parameters ,  and . The inequality in the
proposition guarantees that the value inside the square root is positive.
Stability is eventually lost through a ip bifurcation, because it is condition
1+Tr(J)+Det(J) > 0 that may fail to hold. In two dimensional systems, it is
well known that a ip bifurcation occurs when the line 1+Tr(J)+Det(J) = 0
is crossed with the other two stability conditions being satised (see Medio
and Lines [14] for formal denitions of local bifurcations). No other kind of
bifurcation can occur in the specied case
The relevant result that the two previous propositions imply is that when
we introduce learning, we can only obtain a long term outcome that di¤ers
from the perfect foresight equilibrium if there is a large degree of information
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Figure 3: Bifurcation line for di¤erent values of m.
stickiness, the ratio = is relatively low and the rate of growth of money
supply is relatively high (implying long run scenarios of fast price growth and
even situations of hyperination).
To illustrate the information proposition 2 furnishes, consider gure 3. This
presents the bifurcation line for di¤erent possible values of m in the space
of parameters (i.e., taking into account, as in gure 2, the relation between 
and =). The gure is drawn by rewriting the equality in proposition 2 as


= (2 3)[exp(m)]
2 (2 )
4(1 )[exp(m)]2 and choosing an array of values form (in particular,
we consider m = 0:1, m = 0:333 and m = 1); to the right of each one of
these lines stability holds and local instability will prevail otherwise.
The dashed line in gure 3 represents the boundary already displayed in
gure 2; as remarked then, independently of how high the rate of money growth
is, stability will hold to the right of such frontier. As one considers lower
possible values for this growth rate, the requirements to depart from stability
become more strict, i.e., the closer the rate of money growth is to zero, the
stickier prices will have to be and the lower must be the elasticity of money
demand - real rigidities ratio in order for stability to be lost.
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We have remarked that only fast money growth can lead to the loss of
stability and eventual nonlinear dynamics (which will be characterized in the
following section). Nevertheless, non conventional dynamics can arise for not
too high money growth (and, thus, not too high equilibrium ination rates) in
extreme cases of information stickiness, signicant real rigidities and a small
income elasticity of money demand. For instance, if  = 0:05 (the lower
bound on this parameter that we have assumed earlier and that implied that
information must be updated at least every 5 years) and = is a very small
value, e.g., 0:0005, then the bifurcation occurs at m = 0:027, i.e., for a rate
of money growth such that the equilibrium ination rate is 2:7% per quarter
or 10:73% per year.
The main intuition one withdraws from the previous arguments is that we
can exclude any departure from stability as long as:
a) The economy follows a responsible monetary policy;
b) Agents are not excessively inattentive;
c) The degree of real rigidities is not too strong when compared with the
income change occurring as a reaction to a variation in money demand.
If one of the above conditions fails signicantly, even if the others re-
main at relatively admissible levels, the steady-state ination rate may become
unattainable; the failure to converge to the ination rate equilibrium level may
take various forms and involve di¤erent consequences, as we will discuss in the
next sections.
6 Endogenous Cycles
In the previous section, one has remarked that the introduction of learning will
not change the perfect foresight outcome of convergence towards the monetary
steady state, as long as economic conditions remain normal. By a normal
economic environment we understand a setting where the rate of money growth
is not excessively high, the degree of inattentiveness is kept at a relatively low
value, and the degree of real rigidities is relatively low when compared with
the income elasticity of money demand.
In this section, we look at the consequences over global dynamics of consid-
ering such a learning environment for the formation of expectations. First, the
stable outcome is addressed in terms of velocity of convergence (we compare
the obtained results to the ones found in the perfect foresight case through
gure 1); second, we approach the exception, i.e., what are the implications
of extreme economic conditions that lead to a departure from the scenario of
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convergence towards the monetary steady-state. In this second case, we nd
that the ip bifurcation generates an area (the region locally characterized by
the saddle-path outcome) where endogenous cycles emerge; these cycles are
in some circumstances simple two-period cycles and, for other combinations
of parameter values, quasi-periodic and chaotic uctuations. The existence
of endogenous cycles in situations where the rate of money growth is exces-
sively high constitutes a candidate explanation for why business cycles become
harder to control and predict in scenarios of hyperination (besides the sto-
chastic component of such uctuations, a deterministic uctuation process is
also highlighted).
Consider as a benchmark case of stability under learning the one referred
in section 4 ( = 0:1,  = 0:5,  = 0:25). To draw a gure similar to gure 1,
consider some initial ination rate value and a long run rate of money growth:
0 = 0:04 and m = 0:02. Besides  = 0:25, take also the two alternative
cases  = 0:5 and  = 0:75. Figure 4 presents the process of convergence
of the ination rate towards the equilibrium point in the learning model. By
comparing this gure with gure 1, no relevant di¤erences are found; the degree
of inattentiveness continues to determine the velocity of convergence towards
the steady-state: the stickier the information is (the lengthier is the process of
expectations adjustment), the slower will be the convergence in the direction
of m, i.e., in the direction of the ination rate level that prevails in the
long run. Thus, although other parameters become relevant once we introduce
learning (namely the ratio =), the degree of information stickiness continues
to mainly determine the pace of convergence towards the steady-state.
Recover now the exceptional cases in which the ip bifurcation is crossed.
The numerical - graphical evaluation of the system allows to identify circum-
stances in which the bifurcation simply leads to period two cycles that are
perpetuated over time and cases for which complete a-periodicity and chaos
prevail. Table 1 indicates, for each considered combination of parameters, the
maximum periodicity cycles that may be found in each case. Note that there
are also cases in which the bifurcation directs the system immediately to an
unstable result, existing in these cases no cyclical motion.
An important point to remark at this stage is that initial conditions (in
particular, the initial level of ination) are not relevant in what respects the
long-term dynamic outcome. Every numerical experiment allows to nd a
basin of attraction that is coincident with the state space; this means that the
long-run result is independent of 0.
The presence of chaotic motion for particular parameter values can be
conrmed by computing the corresponding Lyapunov characteristic exponents
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Figure 4: Ination stability dynamics (with learning).
 =
Maximum
periodicity
cycles
 =
Maximum
periodicity
cycles
0:5 0:1 Period 2 0:25 0:3 Period 2
0:5 0:2 Period 2 0:25 0:4 Period 2
0:333 0:1 Chaos (e.g. m = 1) 0:125 0:1 No cycles - instability
0:333 0:2 Period 2 0:125 0:2 Chaos (e.g. m = 0:37)
0:333 0:3 Period 2 0:125 0:3 Period 2
0:25 0:1 Chaos (e.g. m = 0:35) 0:125 0:4 Period 2
0:25 0:2 Chaos (e.g. m = 1)
Table 1: Maximum periodicity cycles found after the bifurcation is crossed
(for selected values of parameters).
(LCEs); these are a measure of exponential divergence of nearby orbits or
sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC). SDIC implies that the same
dynamic process with distinct initial values (even if very close) will generate
completely di¤erent long term time trajectories, characterized by irregular
cycles that do not converge to any steady-state or periodic orbit. Thus, SDIC
is commonly associated with the notion of topological chaos.
In a three dimensional system as the one considered, three LCEs exist. In
practice, only the value of the largest LCE is relevant: if this is negative, a
result other than chaos characterizes long term dynamics; if it is positive, we
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conrm the presence of SDIC. Take, for instance, two of the cases involving
chaos, presented in table 1:  = 1=3; = = 0:1; m = 1 and  = 0:25;
= = 0:1; m = 0:35. For these, one e¤ectively encounters positive largest
Lyapunov exponents (respectively, LCE = 0:077 and LCE = 0:031). All
the cases for which chaos is not found will involve solely negative Lyapunov
exponents.
A graphical illustration of the nonlinear results allows to better understand
how the learning assumption may decisively deviate the economys outcome
from the one suggested by a world where perfect foresight prevails. In gure
5, a bifurcation diagram is represented for a case where chaotic motion is
identied; this is the case in which  = 1=3; = = 0:1. In this specic
setting, the bifurcation occurs for m = 0:41; above this value of the rate
of money growth, a period-two cycle is rst generated and then it leads to a
region in which quasi-periodicity and then chaos will prevail. Figure 6 displays
a strange attractor (the long term relation between the ination level and the
learned rate of ination for the selected parameter values and for m = 1),
relatively to which the presence of chaotic motion is unequivocal.3
It is relevant the kind of nonlinearity one nds when evaluating the global
dynamics of a system that involves a given learning algorithm, as it is the
case. Our learning specication follows closely, as referred earlier, the work by
Bullard [1] who studies the implications of introducing learning into a stan-
dard overlapping generations (OLG) model with a xed point perfect foresight
steady-state (this is the so called monetary steady-state). The referred work,
further discussed in Schonhofer [20] and Tuinstra and Wagener [22], raises a
relevant question: although learning schemes may provide a useful explana-
tion for the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium, the nonlinearities
introduced by the mechanism of learning (e.g., least squares) may imply the
endogenous generation of complex long term dynamics. Forecasting errors will
3Figures 5, 6, 11 and 12 are drawn using iDMC (interactive Dynamical Model Calculator).
This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright of
Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio.
eventually never vanish and attractors di¤erent from the steady-state equi-
librium might emerge. Introducing learning generates, in the referred studies
as well as in the sticky information case we have considered above, long run
endogenous cycles which have gained the designation of learning equilibria;
their main feature is that they depend entirely on fundamental factors, i.e.,
it is not a third variable or an ad-hoc assumption that forces the presence of
nonlinearities. In other words, learning alone produces multiple equilibria.
Using the same analytical structure and employing the same least squares
learning scheme as Bullard [1], Schonhofer [20] focuses the analysis on chaotic
equilibrium trajectories. The nding of chaos in this kind of model gives a
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram ( = 1=3; = = 0:1).
Figure 6: Chaotic attractor ( = 1=3; = = 0:1;m = 1).
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better reply to the persistent use of a learning scheme that generates system-
atic errors. Under a simple periodic cycles result it would be straightforward
to perceive that systematic errors are being made, what would lead the repre-
sentative agent to change her forecasting rule. In the presence of deterministic
chaos, the persistent use of the same ine¢ cient rule may be perpetuated as
agents are unable to distinguish between irregular deterministic behavior and
random deviations from the fundamental solution. This justies the relevance
we put in nding, for some combinations of parameter values, chaotic solu-
tions. Schonhofer [21] raises precisely the question of whether agents have the
ability to learn their way out of chaos and Grandmont [6] discusses the con-
cept of self-fullling mistakewhich is directly attached to the idea that agents
are unable to distinguish between chaotic deterministic behavior and random
noise, and tend to simplify reality by considering that every uctuation has a
stochastic nature.
7 Response to Shocks
The main goal with which the sticky-information paradigm was born was to
measure the impact of external shocks over the equilibrium ination rate. In
Mankiw and Reis [8], four di¤erent types of shocks and the corresponding
e¤ects over the long-run ination trajectory are evaluated. In each one of the
specied scenarios, information stickiness will imply an inertial response to
disturbances on aggregate demand (or on money supply), i.e., the maximum
impact of the shock is felt only after a few time periods (8 to 10 quarters);
once the maximum impact is reached, the ination rate will gradually converge
once again to the steady-state value, that in this type of exercise is assumed
to be  = 0, for simplifying purposes.
To illustrate how learning changes the response to monetary shocks, we
consider the fourth experience described in Mankiw and Reis [8]. The variation
in money supply is modelled as a rst-order autoregressive process, i.e., mt =
mt 1 + "t, with jj < 1 and "t a disturbance term representing eventual
perturbations over the money supply growth rate. We consider  = 0:5 and
the shock is modelled as "t=0 =  0:007 ("t6=0 = 0), i.e., a negative shock
over the evolution of mt occurs at t = 0. Under perfect foresight, the inertia
e¤ect is evident: the impact of the monetary policy shock reveals its maximum
strength only some time after the disturbance takes place; this negative e¤ect
vanishes after around 20 periods. The policy experiment is conducted for
 = 0:1,  = 1 and  = 0:25.
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We apply precisely the same policy experiment to our learning setup (using
the same parameter values); no signicant qualitative di¤erences are found:
the shock disturbs the ination rate path negatively, the e¤ect involves some
inertia and, again, after a few periods the impact of the shock begins to vanish.
The main di¤erences are that with learning the impact of the shock is less
accentuated (the maximum impact over ination corresponds to less than a half
of the impact in the rational expectations case) and with learning the process
of recovery towards the initial state is slower. These results are displayed in
gure 7, where we compare the impact of the disturbance for the rational
expectations case and for two learning possibilities. Learning model 1 is the
case characterized in the previous sections; learning model 2 respects to an
alternative specication that is described in appendix C and that involves
a more sophisticated learning rule, where rational expectations gradually lose
weight and learning gradually gains weight as older time periods are considered.
The evident feature in gure 7 is that under learning the impact of the shock
is less pronounced (it will be more pronounced for the learning specication
in the text than for the case in appendix C, because the rst attributes more
weight to learning). We also observe that the larger is the importance of
learning (rst learning model) the lengthier will be the convergence towards
the steady-state; this is apparently an intuitive result because with learning
we introduce a second element of inertia: not only information is sticky (i.e.,
agents are inattentive) but agents will also need time to learn the way economic
aggregates evolve over time.
One can also evaluate how a change in the growth of money supply changes
ination paths when nonlinearities are present. Focus the attention on the
rst learning model and on the example that allowed to build the bifurcation
diagram in gure 5. In this case,  = 1=3 and = = 0:1. A rst bifurcation
occurs at m = 0:41 and a second bifurcation, in the transition between
a period two-cycle and quasi-periodicity is observed at around m = 0:48.
Thus, a one time change in the rate of money growth can have dramatic
implications over the observed type of dynamics. This is illustrated in gure
8. In this gure, we begin by considering that m = 0:4, situation in which
the system converges towards a unique equilibrium ination rate; a shock on
the money supply growth rate may imply a change on the topological nature of
the system, generating a di¤erent evolution pattern of ination over time. In
this case, by assuming that at a moment t = 50, the growth rate ofmt becomes
m = 0:5, one e¤ectively observes a relevant change in the long-run behavior
of the ination rate - now, it evolves a-periodically. As a result, a permanent
change in the equilibrium rate of money growth not only changes the average
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Figure 7: Response to a monetary shock.
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Figure 8: Ination dynamics with a monetary shock occurring at a bifurcation
point.
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ination rate, it also modies the qualitative behavior of the time path of
ination: from a xed-point stability result  = 0:4, the system has jumped
to an irregular movement around the new steady-state  = 0:5. Therefore,
by allowing for the possibility of stronger rates of money growth, the central
bank may be opening the door for an ine¤ective monetary policy: although
the rate of money growth remains constant over time, the ination rate will
no longer evolve following a pattern of stability.
8 Conclusion
The question asked in this paper is whether the departure from the perfect
foresight assumption in a deterministic version of the sticky information macro
model produces relevant changes in terms of the obtained stability results.
In the assumed setting, if expectations about the value of the ination rate
today are generated today, then perfect foresight prevails; if the update of
information is made in any moment of the past, such information about the
state of the economy will be simply ignored in favour of resorting to the known
past performance of the ination rate, which allows to predict the current
value.4
The adopted least squares learning algorithm through which ination is
(partially) forecasted discloses a relevant role of the degree of sticky infor-
mation in determining stability. While under perfect foresight the degree of
information updating only inuences the velocity of convergence towards the
steady-state, the inclusion of learning allows for the loss of stability when the
information updating process is strongly sluggish. Other parameters also de-
termine the stability outcome: if the extent of real rigidities (e.g., externalities
or nancial market imperfections) is large (relatively to the income elasticity of
money demand), convergence towards the monetary steady-state may as well
be compromised. One has also remarked that divergence from the equilibrium
only occurs for relatively large rates of growth of money supply, indicating an
association, which appears elsewhere in the literature, between nonlinearities
and cases of hyperination.
4A second, more elaborated, setting is considered in appendix: in this, expectations about
the current ination level will always include a component of perfect foresight relating to
previous periodsinformation updating about the state of the economy; however, the weight
of this component will diminish as we consider further away in the past time moments. As
perfect foresight loses weight, agents will use progressively more a learning rule that allows
to forecast current ination resorting solely to past information regarding this variable - the
two specications allow for similar results from a qualitative point of view, although in the
rst setting the loss of stability is possible for a wider range of parameter combinations,
because we attribute a stronger role to learning.
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The studied dynamic system allows for a loss of stability only through a
ip bifurcation. This leads in most of the circumstances to cycles of period-
icity 2, which can degenerate in some of the cases into quasi-periodicity and
chaos. Chaotic results are particularly relevant because they possibly imply
the presence of systematic errors that the agents cannot separate from random
noise. Imagining that cycles are identiable with stochastic processes, agents
will have no incentive to switch to another, better performing, learning algo-
rithm (which in the present case would mean to estimate directly the ination
rate and not the dynamic behavior of prices).
The analysis of the reaction of ination to monetary policy shocks indi-
cates that learning produces a less severe e¤ect of disturbances over price
changes, although such e¤ect is felt over a wider range of time periods. Fur-
thermore, monetary policy shocks gain a deeper relevance when nonlinearities
are observed, since such shocks may change the qualitative nature of the re-
sults allowing a xed-point outcome to be transformed into an irregular path
or vice-versa. This last feature has important implications concerning public
policy; if the monetary authorities are able to perceive that the main source
of uctuations is endogenous, then they may be able to identify in what ex-
tent the rate of money growth needs to be changed in order to stabilize the
evolution of prices.
Appendix
Appendix A - Derivation of quation (4)
Following Mankiw and Reis [9], we take the simplest possible assumption con-
cerning monetary policy. Namely, we consider a money market equilibrium
condition of the form
mt   pt = yt (a1)
Variable mt is the money supply, i.e., it is the policy instrument to which
public authorities can resort to. Parameter  > 0 is the income elasticity of
money demand.
Monetary policy will, then, be modelled by simply considering a constant
rate of money growth, i.e., mt+1  mt = m > 0, with m0 given.
E
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Replacing (a1) into (3) in order to remove the output gap and its growth
rate from the expression of the sticky-information Phillips curve, the following
relation is obtained:
t =


(mt 1   pt 1) +    


1X
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) + 

m (a2)
To present (a2), one has kept in mind that
1P
j=0
(1 )j = 1=. Equation (a2)
establishes a relation between prices and money supply; this relation becomes
easier to analyze if one applies rst-di¤erences. In this way, the relation will
simply involve the constant rate of money growth and the value of the ination
rate in two consecutive time moments. Straightforward algebra will conduct
to equation (4) as presented in the text.
Appendix B - Details on Monetary Policy
The paper has considered the most simple approach to monetary policy. This
was done for the sake of tractability, however the model can be easily extended
in order to include a more realistic characterization of monetary policy. In this
appendix, we briey explain how monetary policy decisions could be endoge-
nously modelled, by assuming that the nominal interest rate is an endogenous
variable that the central bank may control in order to inuence the macroeco-
nomic outcome, both in real and nominal terms.
Consider a static and deterministic IS relation5:
yt = '0   '1(it   t); '0; '1 > 0 (a3)
where it represents the nominal interest rate. The IS equation presents the
conventional relation of opposite sign between the real interest rate and the
output gap. The interest rate can be determined optimally, given some objec-
tive function of the monetary authority or, alternatively, a Taylor rule can be
applied. Such rule can take the form:
it = i
 + t + yyt; ; y > 0 (a4)
5If one intended to further sophisticate the presentation, the IS could be transformed into
a dynamic relation, by assuming an expected ination rate rather than observed ination at
moment t. Since one just intends to illustrate how monetary policy could be given a more
relevant role in the analysis, we simply assume a static conventional relation between the
output gap and the real interest rate.
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Parameter i represents the equilibrium nominal interest rate. The Taylor
rule describes how the central bank will react to changes in the state variables,
i.e., to changes in the values of the ination rate and of the output gap.6
By replacing the interest rate in (a4) into (a3), we nd the following relation
between the output gap and the ination rate:
yt =
'0   '1i + '1(1  )t
1 + '1y
(a5)
6As with the IS equation, the Taylor rule can take slightly di¤erent forms. For instance,
the interest rate may react not to the observed ination rate but to the expected ination
rate (or to the di¤erence between the expected ination and an ination rate target dened
by the central bank).
If one replaces the value of the output gap as presented above into the
sticky-information Phillips curve, (3), we will obtain a dynamic equation with
a single endogenous variable - the ination rate. That equation could be an-
alyzed under learning in the same way one has proceeded with equation (4).
The main di¤erence is that in such case one would not have the change in
money supply as the policy instrument; the parameters subject to the even-
tual manipulation of the authorities would be the ones we have just specied:
'0; '1; i
;  and y. Thus, the option for such a non elaborated specication
of monetary policy has served the purpose of analyzing ination dynamics
having in mind a single bifurcation parameter that comprises the whole of the
monetary policy actions that can be followed by the central bank.
Appendix C - An Alternative Specication
In this appendix, we take a di¤erent assumption in terms of formation of ex-
pectations relatively to the one in section 4; the goal is to check the robustness
of the models results by analyzing a more sophisticated rule of ination ex-
pectations; results will be similar in qualitative terms, although they will be
closer to the ones in the original model, given that a less relevant role is at-
tributed to the learning component in the formation of expectations. Instead
of considering learning for every time period previous to t, we will assume that
the capacity to perfectly predict todays ination rate fades away as we con-
sider more distant in the past time moments. The assumption is analytically
translated in the following expectations formation rule:
Et j(t) =
1
1 + j
t +
j
1 + j
bt (a6)
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As before, bt respects to the estimated level of ination at t computed by
resorting to all the information on  through t  1. The intuition is as follows:
when j = 0, expectations about ination are formed in the present moment,
and therefore agents know with absolute certainty that the ination rate is
t; in the opposite circumstance, when j ! 1, information about the state
of the economy was updated so far in the past that agents will display no
ability to generate accurate perfect foresight expectations on t; thus, they
will fully resort to the learning procedure in order to predict ination, i.e.,
lim
N!1
Et N (t) = bt. Between the extreme time moments t and t   N , ex-
pectations will be formed by weighting both the information on the state of
the economy and the time series of the ination rate. The weight of the per-
fect foresight component falls the larger is the distance of the generation of
information period relatively to the present moment. Note that the sum of
the weights in (a6) is 1, meaning that the relative increase of weight of one
of the expectation rules is made at the expenses of the other: as the ability
to produce perfect foresight expectations falls, the larger will be the relevance
agents attribute to learning. This departs from the rst specication in the
sense that then perfect foresight was possible only in the present moment and
it would be absent from the formation of expectations in any past moment,
while now such ability will fade away in a progressive way as we go back in
time.
Recover the sticky-information term of the ination dynamic equation in
(4). Replacing in such term the ination expectations by the expression in
(a6) yields the following equality:

1X
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) = t
1X
j=0
(1  )j
1 + j
+ bt 1X
j=0
j(1  )j
1 + j
The following (exact) series results hold,
1X
j=0
(1  )j
1 + j
=   ln
1  
1X
j=0
j(1  )j
1 + j
=
1

+
ln
1  
Thus, we further simplify the past expectations term,

1X
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) = bt    ln
1  (t   bt) (a7)
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To better understand the relation between the degree of information sticki-
ness and the series of past expectations, we rearrange (a7) to write the equality
as

1P
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t)  bt
t   bt =   ln1   (a8)
Expression (a8) allows to characterize how di¤erent degrees of stickiness
lead to a departure from the perfect foresight outcome. Consider precisely the
perfect foresight benchmark case. In this situation, the l.h.s. of (a8) is equal to
1; such result arises only in the instantaneous information updating case, i.e.,
for  = 1. The value of the expression in (a8) will fall below 1 for  < 1, with
such value being as much lower as the lower is the value of the information
0.25 0.5 0.75
l
ll
-
-
1
ln
0.693
0.863
1
l1
0.462
Figure 9: Information stickiness and expectations under learning (2nd model).
stickiness parameter. Figure 9 represents function f() =   ln
1  ; this is an
increasing and concave function where we e¤ectively observe that f(1) = 1.
Therefore, one concludes that the larger is the degree of information stickiness,
the more the ratio in the l.h.s. of (a8) will depart from 1, and this essentially
means that the larger is the degree of information stickiness, the more the
series 
1P
j=0
(1  )jEt j (t) will depart from the perfect foresight outcome t.
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Replacing expectations, as presented in (a7), into the ination dynamics
equation (4), one obtains:
t+1 =
1
(=)(1  +  ln)   ln 
f(1  )m+ [(=)(1  +  ln)  (1  + ln)]t
+(=  1)(1  +  ln)(bt+1   bt)g (a9)
As in the rst explored case, taking bt+1 = t+1 and bt = t would imply
returning to the benchmark perfect foresight setting, i.e., the learning compo-
nent would be eliminated.
Equation (a9) together with (10) and (11), will constitute the new dynamic
model relatively to which one intends to address stability properties. We follow
the same procedure as in the rst model, i.e., we begin by linearizing the system
in the steady-state vicinity [the steady-state (; b; ) is exactly the same as
in the rst version of the model],
24 bt+1   bt+1   
t+1   
35 =
264 1  
  0
(1 )e    1 +    (1 )(+)e 0
0 2

[exp(m)]3
1  
375
24 bt   bt   
t   
35
(a10)
with e := (=)(1  ) + (=  1) ln.
Again, resorting to the center manifold theorem, which allows to restrict the
local analysis to the sub-matrix eJ of the Jacobian matrix in expression (a10)
composed by the rst two rows and the rst two columns, one withdraws the
main stability properties of the system.
Proposition 3 If 

 (1 )(2 )+2(1 +2 ln)
4(1 + ln) , then the system is locally stable8m > 0. For a degree of information stickiness such that   0:383, stability
will hold independently of the values of m,  and .
Proof. Trace and determinant of eJ are, respectively, Tr( eJ) = 2  (1 )e  
1 e  and Det( eJ) = 1  (1 )e   (1 )2e .
The stability conditions 1   Det( eJ) = 1 e [+ (1  )] > 0 and 1  
Tr( eJ) + Det( eJ) = (1 )e  > 0 hold, for any admissible combination of
parameter values. The only constraint on stability comes from condition
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1+Tr( eJ)+Det( eJ) > 0, which requires  < 4e 2(1 )
(1 )(2 ) . The equilibrium value
of the gain sequence variable is bounded below 1, and therefore if 4
e 2(1 )
(1 )(2 ) 
1, then stability is guaranteed. This last inequality is equivalent to the one
presented in the proposition.
Recalling that = must be larger than zero, if the r.h.s. of the inequality
is non negative one guarantees the presence of stability for any positive rate
of money supply; this value is above (or equal to) zero as long as   0:383
The condition   0:383 indicates that introducing learning into the for-
mation of expectations in the way we have just done implies stability of the
monetary steady state as long as information is updated at least every 2:611
quarters (1=0:383) or 7: 832 9 months (3=0:383); more infrequent information
updating can lead to a departure from the stability outcome, depending on the
values assumed by the degree of real rigidities, the income elasticity of money
demand and the growth rate of money supply.
The limit value of  above which stability is guaranteed is lower in the
present case than in the rst models specication. This is intuitively correct,
because in the current case we attribute a less signicant role to learning
(relatively to perfect foresight); therefore, the loss of stability can only occur
for relatively larger values of information stickiness (lower values of parameter
).
If the possibility of loss of stability is present, we can state the following
result.
Proposition 4 Let 

< (1 )(2 )+2(1 +2 ln)
4(1 + ln) . In this case, local stability
will require an upper bound on the rate of money growth. In the point in which
m = ln
q
(1 )(2 )
(1 )(2 )+2(1 +2 ln) 4(=)(1 + ln) , a ip bifurcation occurs.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is straightforward: consider the in-
equality found in the previous propositions proof,  < 4
e 2(1 )
(1 )(2 ) ; by recalling
that  = 1  [exp(m)] 2 and by rearranging this inequality, one arrives to:
m < ln
s
(1  )(2  )
(1  )(2  ) + 2(1  + 2 ln)  4(=)(1  +  ln)
Therefore, one realizes that stability requires the money growth rate to be
below a given combination of parameters ,  and . The inequality in the
proposition guarantees that the value inside the square root is positive.
As in the rst discussed case, it is condition 1 + Tr( eJ) +Det( eJ) > 0 that
may not hold. In the point at which 1+Tr( eJ)+Det( eJ) = 0, a ip bifurcation
takes place
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A contour plot similar to the one in gure 3 can be presented for the
case now in appreciation. Figure 10 takes, once again, the values m = 0:1,
m = 0:333 and m = 1 to draw the corresponding bifurcation lines. These
have a similar pattern relatively to the one characterized in gure 3, but now
the conditions for the loss of stability are more strict: a stronger level of
information stickiness is required, and the value of the ratio = needs to be
lower for each value of m.
To arrive to the lines in gure 10, one has to rewrite the ip bifurcation
condition in proposition 4 in the following way:


=
[(1  )(2  ) + 2(1  + 2 ln)] [exp(m)]2   (1  )(2  )
4(1  +  ln) [exp(m)]2
b/a
l0.383
Dm=0.1
1/2
0.432
0.243
0.091
0.3020.1190.028
Dm=0.333 Dm=1 Dm®¥
Figure 10: Bifurcation line for di¤erent values of m (2nd model).
The values of = in the limit case  = 0 is the same as in the rst proposed
scenario, but the values of  for each m in the extreme point = = 0 are
lower; as a result, larger degrees of inattentiveness are now needed to depart
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from stability (for the same rate of money growth). As in gure 3, the area
below each bifurcation line represents local instability, while stability prevails
for combinations of parameter values locating above the represented lines.
Given the qualitative similarities with the case addressed in the body of
text, we omit a thorough graphical analysis concerning both local and global
dynamics. From a global point of view, we nd a similar type of outcomes:
under stability, the frequency of information updating is determinant in what
respects the velocity of convergence (once more, the smaller is , the slower
will be the convergence process). The breakdown of stability generates as well
a region of cyclical motion. Table 2 indicates, for selected parameter values,
the type of dynamics that is installed. As in the benchmark case, period 2
cycles dominate but quasi-periodicity and chaotic motion are possible in some
cases, with the relevant consequences we have already mentioned.
Figure 11 presents a bifurcation diagram for a setting where quasi-periodicity
is identied, but chaotic motion is absent (irregular cycles are displayed, how-
ever they do not represent a situation of complete divergence of nearby orbits);
this is the case in which  = 0:1; = = 0:15. In this specic setting, the bi-
furcation occurs at m = 0:552; above this value of the rate of money growth,
a period two cycle is rst generated and then it leads to a region in which
quasi-periodic cycles will hold. Figure 12 displays an attractor, i.e., the long
term relation between the ination level and the learned rate of ination for a
set of parameter values ( = 0:1; = = 0:1; m = 2) relatively to which the
presence of chaotic motion is clear.
Figure 11: Bifurcation diagram ( = 0:1, = = 0:15) 2nd model.
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 =
Maximum
periodicity
cycles
 =
Maximum
periodicity
cycles
0:35 0:05 Period 2 0:15 0:25 Period 2
0:3 0:05 Period 2 0:1 0:05 No cycles -instability
0:3 0:1 Period 2 0:1 0:1 Chaos (e.g. m = 2)
0:25 0:05 Period 2 0:1 0:15
Quasi-periodicity
(e.g. m = 0:7)
0:25 0:1 Period 2 0:1 0:2 Period 2
0:25 0:15 Period 2 0:1 0:25 Period 2
0:2 0:05 Period 2 0:1 0:3 Period 2
0:2 0:1 Period 2 0:05 0:05 No cycles -instability
0:2 0:15 Period 2 0:05 0:1 No cycles -instability
0:2 0:2 Period 2 0:05 0:15 No cycles -instability
0:15 0:05 Chaos (e.g. m = 1:8) 0:05 0:2 Chaos (e.g. m = 1:5)
0:15 0:1 Period 2 0:05 0:25 Period 2
0:15 0:15 Period 2 0:05 0:3 Period 2
0:15 0:2 Period 2 0:05 0:35 Period 2
Table 2: Maximum periodicity cycles found after the bifurcation is crossed
(2nd model).
Figure 12: Chaotic attractor ( = 0:1, = = 0:1, m = 2) 2nd model.
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